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Abstract—Intrusion response is a critical part of security
protection. Compared with IT systems, industrial automation
systems (IASs) have greater timeliness and availability demands.
Real-time security policy enforcement of intrusion response is
a challenge facing intrusion response for IASs. Inappropriate
enforcement of the security policy can influence normal opera-
tion of the control system, and the loss caused by this security
policy may even exceed that caused by cyberattacks. However,
existing research about intrusion response focuses on security pol-
icy decisions and ignores security policy execution. This paper
proposes a general, real-time control approach based on table-
driven scheduling of intrusion response in IASs to address the
problem of security policy execution. Security policy consists of
a security service group, with each type of security service sup-
ported by a realization task set. Realization tasks from several
task sets can be combined to form a response task set. In the
proposed approach, first, a response task set is generated by a
nondominated sorting genetic algorithm (GA) II with joint con-
sideration of security performance and cost. Then, the system is
reconfigured through an integrated scheduling scheme where sys-
tem tasks and response tasks are mapped and scheduled together
based on a GA. Furthermore, results from both numerical simu-
lations and a real-application simulation show that the proposed
method can implement the security policy in time with little effect
on the system.
Index Terms—Industrial automation, intrusion response, secu-
rity protection, task scheduling.
I. INTRODUCTION
MODERN industrial automation systems (IASs) are com-posed of physical plants that perform the physical
processes and networks of embedded computers that perform
the computational processes necessary to monitor and con-
trol the physical processes [1]. IASs are extensively applied
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in national economical industrial fields, such as water treat-
ment, chemical processing, oil and natural gas distribution,
and smart grids, which are at the core of critical infrastruc-
tures [2]–[5]. With the wide application of information and
communication technologies to IASs and the rapid growth
of viruses in IASs [6], [7], improving security protection has
become a critical task that system designers must face [1], [8].
Security protection of IASs emphasizes the concept of
in-depth defense [9]. Security protection provided by field
devices is the last defense of the in-depth defense; it provides
intrinsic security for field control systems. Much research
about security protection integrated control theory for field
control systems has been presented [10], [11], and some litera-
ture has studied the security protection at the field control layer
from the perspective of software implementation [12]–[14].
As the workflow of process industry automation is coherent,
security protection of process industry automation should be
done from a perspective of whole system. In addition to
other security mechanisms such as industrial firewalls and
intrusion detection and response are also two key elements
of the dynamic security protection of IASs [6], [15], [16].
Research working in the field of security protection of IASs
is focusing on intrusion detection technology [5], [17]–[20].
Comparatively, there are few studies about intrusion response
of industrial automation [21]–[23].
Intrusion response systems (IRSs) can be classified into
three types: 1) manual IRSs; 2) semiautomatic IRSs; and
3) automatic IRSs. IASs have high availability demands, which
means the manual and the semi-automatic intrusion response
will not meet the security protection requirements for IASs.
Automatic intrusion response has been a research topic in the
IT domain for several years. Foo et al. [24] presented an
automated response mechanism in an intrusion tolerant sys-
tem, called ADEPTS, which uses a graph of intrusion goals
(I-GRAPH) as the underlying representation in the system.
Zonouz et al. [21] proposed a new approach about automated
intrusion response called RRE which can analyze undesired
security events and their countermeasures based on attack-
response trees. Fessi et al. [23] designed a multiattribute
genetic algorithm (GA) approach for handling a multiattribute
decision problem in intrusion response. These works focus
on security policy decision and ignore the security policy
execution, i.e., instant intrusion response.
In intrusion response, a security policy contains many dif-
ferent types of security services. Furthermore, in dynamic
security protection, security policy changes in real-time [15].
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For example, in a certain situation, a security policy generated
by a security policy decision is composed of an encryption
service and an access control service. When the attack sit-
uation changes, a security policy decision may generate a
new security policy that is composed of access control ser-
vices only. Each type of security service can be implemented
by various realization tasks. For instance, the encryption ser-
vice can be realized by many cryptographic algorithms, such
as Rivest Shamir Adlemen (RSA), Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4),
or data encrypt standard (DES). Therefore, the response task
set generated from a security policy is also changing in real-
time. On the other hand, system tasks of IASs have real-time
characteristics. They are simple and fixed, and these tasks are
generally scheduled by table-driven scheduling algorithms to
achieve predictable behaviors [25], [26]. Thus, to execute a
security policy in IASs, response tasks cannot be treated in a
simple way (such as simply consider them as new, high priority
tasks). Execution of the security policy without any counter-
measures may affect the system task behaviors and the normal
operation of the system [27]. For example, a security policy is
composed of an encryption service that is realized by a task. If
this task is executed without considering the execution of other
tasks in the system, it may affect the real-time performance of
these other tasks or make some tasks unable to be executed
smoothly within the required time. The loss caused by inap-
propriate execution of a security policy may even be more than
that caused by cyberattacks. IASs are quite different from IT
systems in some ways. IASs have an inherent character of real-
time response and determinacy that is embodied by real-time
tasks and communication. In time-based security (TBS) the-
ory, security is defined as a system that can detect and respond
to cyberattacks before security threats happen or reach the tar-
get system [28], [29], i.e., timeliness is the key issue of online
security protection.
Task scheduling is an important guarantee of effective
task execution [30], [31]. There is some literature available
to research task scheduling and optimization with multicon-
straints [32]–[34]. Liu et al. [33] proposed a novel security
constraint model based on the formulation of a scheduling prob-
lem for work-flow applications in distributed data-intensive
computing environments. Saleh and Dong [34] designed a
real-time multiagent design model and proposed an adaptive
security-aware scheduling system that is combined with secu-
rity service enhancement. These methods are designed for IT
systems, and security requirements are regarded as constraints.
They leave intrusion response tasks out of consideration.
System tasks in IASs are generally simple and fixed, which
are very different from the tasks in IT systems and are usually
scheduled by table-driven scheduling algorithms [25], [26].
In this paper, we propose a general real-time control
approach based on table-driven task scheduling of intrusion
response in IASs. In this approach, the response tasks and
system tasks are integrated into the task scheduling table
with various requirements being considered to achieve instant
intrusion response to cyberattacks. First, through a multiobjec-
tive optimization method based on the nondominated sorting
GA II (NSGA-II), an intrusion response task set is gener-
ated from the security policy with consideration of security
Fig. 1. Dynamic security protection model for IASs.
performance and cost in IASs. Second, a unified task model is
conducted based on the combination of the intrusion response
task set and a system task set. A distributed table-driven
task scheduling and optimization scheme based on a GA
and directed acyclic graph (DAG) is designed to update the
task scheduling tables. Then, the system is reconfigured by
updating the task scheduling tables to ensure the execution of
intrusion response tasks and the normal operation of system
functions. At last, the effectiveness of the proposed approach is
verified by numerical simulations and application simulations
based on a real-application system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the real-time issue of intrusion response in IASs is presented,
and then a general real-time control architecture of intru-
sion response that contains response task set generation and
integrated scheduling is proposed. Section III designs a multi-
objective optimization method for response task set generation
based on a given security policy. Integrated scheduling and
optimization for the combination of the response task set and
the system task set is presented by using a GA in Section IV.
Sections V and VI show numerical simulations and applica-
tion simulations, respectively. Finally, the study is concluded
in Section VII with a summary of the research undertaken and
plans for future research.
II. REAL-TIME CONTROL ISSUE OF INTRUSION
RESPONSE FOR IASS
A. Problem Description
IASs are characterized by real-time and high reliability [35].
Meanwhile, IASs are industrial production systems and are
safety critical systems. They should be able to defend them-
selves against the complicated and changing cyberattacks at
runtime, i.e., they need to have dynamic security protection.
The dynamic security protection for IASs is essential against
cyberattacks [15]. Fig. 1 shows a general dynamic secu-
rity protection model for IASs. Dynamic security protection
of IASs consists of two parts: 1) intrusion detection and
2) intrusion response. Intrusion response is responsible for
security policy decision and security policy enforcement.
The security policy is generated at the security policy deci-
sion phase [22], while the security policy is interpreted and
executed in the systems at the security policy enforcement
phase.
Generally, a security policy is composed of differ-
ent kinds of security services forming a security service
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group (SSG) [36], and each type of security service can be
implemented by various realization tasks. Thus, in the pro-
cess of dynamic security protection, real-time security policies
can be interpreted as different numbers and different types of
response tasks that can take up system resources, such as com-
munication bandwidth, CPU time, and memory. Therefore,
the enforcement of these response tasks may disrupt the sys-
tem task scheduling and affect the system’s normal operation.
On the other hand, the response tasks generated from secu-
rity policy directly determine the security performance of
IRSs. Consequently, an integrated real-time task enforcement
approach of intrusion response for IASs is needed to ensure
the smooth and efficient enforcement of security policy and
the system’s normal operation.
In this paper, we focus on the security policy enforce-
ment component of intrusion response for IASs. A general
real-time table-driven task scheduling approach of intrusion
response is designed to solve this problem, where response
tasks and system tasks are scheduled and optimized together
with consideration of multiple constraints in IASs. The
response tasks are generated dynamically according to a
security policy, which are used to realize security services
in the security policy. The system tasks include functional
tasks and other nonfunctional (not pertaining to security)
tasks.
B. Formalizing the Problem
An IAS is considered as a combination of a system task set
Tsys and a node set N = {pi}. Suppose that the system tasks
are dependent, nonpreemptible periodic tasks, and all nodes in
the node set N to be homogenous. IASs nodes include control
devices, intelligent sensors, and intelligent actuators. Let P
represent a given security policy, and as mentioned above,
the security policy can be regarded as an SSG composed of
different kinds of security services [36]. So the security policy
P can be formalized as
P = {S1, . . . , Si, . . . , Sk} (1)
where Si is a security service and can be realized by many
realization tasks, that is
Si  Ri =
{
ri1, ri2, . . . , riqi
} (2)
where Ri is the realization task set of security service Si. For
example, the encryption service is a security service, which
can be realized by many cryptographic algorithms, such as
RSA, RC4, and DES. The parameters of a response task set Ri
are obtained offline. In this paper, we focus on security policy
enforcement of IRSs based on a given security policy [shown
as (1)], and do not discuss security policy decisions. Define
Tr is the response task set that is generated from security pol-
icy P = {S1, . . . , Si, . . . , Sk}, and the global task set T is used
to represent the combination of the response task set Tr and
the system task set Tsys. For easy of understanding, the nota-
tions and their meanings used in this paper are summarized in
Table I.
TABLE I
DEFINITIONS OF NOTATIONS
Fig. 2. Real-time control architecture of intrusion response for IASs.
C. Real-Time Control Architecture of Intrusion
Response for IASs
To ensure enforcement of the intrusion response of IASs,
a real-time control approach of intrusion response based on
table-driven task scheduling and optimization is proposed,
which is shown in Fig. 2.
As shown in Fig. 2, the intrusion detection and the secu-
rity policy decision components are executed periodically,
and the security policy generated from the security policy
decision component is the real-time input of security policy
enforcement component. This is a two-stage process contain-
ing response task set generation and integrated scheduling.
In the response task set generation stage, with consideration
of security performance requirements and time constraints,
the Pareto solution of a response task set is generated from the
security policy through the NSGA-II. Then, a solution in
the form of a response task set having the highest security
4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS: SYSTEMS
Fig. 3. Flowchart of task scheduling and optimization.
performance in the Pareto solution is selected as the opti-
mal response task set. In the integrated scheduling stage, the
response task set Tr is first combined with system task set
Tsys to generate the global system task set T . Then, based on
a DAG, a GA-based task scheduler is used to reconfigure the
global system scheduling tables. If the global system task set is
unschedulable, the response task set with slightly lower secu-
rity performance will be re-elected as the optimizing response
task set. The flowchart of the task scheduling and optimization
is shown in Fig. 3.
III. RESPONSE TASK SET GENERATION OF
INTRUSION RESPONSE FOR IASS
In this section, a response task set generation scheme of
intrusion response is presented. We first model the problems
of response task set generation, then we solve this problem
using NSGA-II.
A. Modeling the Problem
The realization task rij is defined as rij = (cij, wij, ccij, ptij),
where cij and wij are the cycle time and (worst case) execu-
tion time of the realization task rij, respectively. ccij is defined
as the communication load of the realization task rij, which
is represented as the byte count of the exchanged data of the
realization task rij in one period time cij. ptij is the security
protection time that the realization task rij can provide, which
means the duration time that the attacker is able to achieve
an attack goal in the system when the realization task rij is
employed [28], [29]. Thus, ptij of the rij is different for the dif-
ferent types of attacks. The first three parameters of the rij can
be determined in advance through evaluation [31], [36], [37],
while the ptij of the rij for each type of attack can be listed
online and determined in a security policy decision. It is impor-
tant to note that heterogeneous processors are not considered
here, i.e., all processors are treated the same.
Fig. 4. TBS protection.
Then, the response task set Tr = {tr1, . . . , tri , . . . , trk} is gen-
erated from the security policy P = {S1, . . . , Si, . . . , Sk}. Each
individual response task tri is chosen from the corresponding
realization task set Ri. Thus, a security policy may have dif-
ferent security performances because a security policy can be
realized by different SSGs that may have different security
performances. For instance, the security performance of two
cryptographic algorithms (e.g., RSA and DES) is obviously
different. Security performance can be measured by time, i.e.,
TBS theory [28]. Security is defined as an intrusion attack
that is detected and responded to in time [28], [29]. Thus,
systems must be recovered before attackers achieve their intru-
sion goals. As shown in Fig. 4, security is formalized as
follows:
PT > Dett + Rest (3)
where PT is the security protection time provided by the SSG,
Dett and Rest are the intrusion detection time and the intrusion
response time, respectively. The latter two parameters can be
considered as constants for a specific system. Security time
margin (STM) is defined as the difference between PT and
Dett + Rest, i.e., STM = PT − (Dett + Rest). Thus, STM ≤ 0
represents a system that is insecure, while STM > 0 rep-
resents a system that is secure. The STM can represent the
security level.
For competition reasons, many intelligent devices at field
control layer in IASs are implemented based on embedded sys-
tems, where the CPU performance, communication bandwidth,
and memory size of IASs are designed according to rather
limited requirements. Because of the business competition in
IASs, cost is an important factor that must be considered
during design and implementation. Most intelligent devices
at the field control layer in IASs are implemented based on
embedded systems, where the CPU performance, communi-
cation bandwidth, and memory size are designed according
to rather limited requirements. Thus, in this paper, the IRS is
constructed under certain resource constraints. In addition, the
IRS is used to mitigate the effect of a cyberattack and pro-
tect system functions, which are implemented in IAS nodes.
Thus, IAS nodes share the CPU resources and communica-
tion bus with the IRS, which requires that the response tasks
of the IRS always affects the system’s normal operation. So,
the response tasks of IRS should be considered together with
system function tasks to mitigate impacts of the IRS on system
functions.
Therefore, three optimization goals should be considered in
the process of the response task set generation: security per-
formance, the communication load and execution time of task.
Let a decision variable xij denote whether the jth realization
task in realization task set Ri is selected to implement the
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ith security service Si, and X = (X1, . . . , Xi, . . . , Xk), where
Xi = (xi1, . . . , xij, . . . , xiqi)
xij =
{
1, rij is selected
0, rij is not selected
(4)
xij should satisfy the following constraint:
∑qi
j=1 xij = 1.
Then, the security protection time of the response task
set Tr = {tr1, . . . , tri , . . . , trk} can be calculated as PT =∑k
i=1
∑qi
j=1 xijptij. The communication load per unit of time
of the response task rij is ccij/cij and the communication
load of the response task set can be represented as CC =∑k
i=1
∑qi
j=1 (xijccij/cij). Analogously, the sum of the execu-
tion times of the response tasks in the response task set can
be represented as ET = ∑ki=1
∑qi
j=1 (xijwij/cij). Meanwhile, as
shown in Fig. 4, to ensure that the system is secure, the fol-
lowing constraint must be satisfied: PT ≥ (Dett + Rest), with
Dett and Rest considered as constants for a specific system.
To generate the response task set Tr the problem is formal-
ized as a multiobjective optimization problem (MOOP). The
objective functions of this MOOP model are stated as
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Min ET =
k∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
xijwij/cij
Min CC =
k∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
xijccij/cij
Max PT =
k∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
xijptij.
(5)
And the constraints of the MOOP model are expressed as
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
PT > (Dett + Rest) (6a)
qi∑
j=1
xij = 1. (6b)
Meanwhile, the decision variable is represented as
X = (X1, . . . , Xi, . . . , Xk) (7)
where Xi = (xi1, . . . , xij, . . . , xiqi). Then, the problem of
response task set generation can be formalized as (5) and (6).
B. Using the NSGA-II to Solve the MOOP Problem
Many evolutionary algorithms have been developed to solve
MOOP problems, such as simulated annealing algorithm, par-
ticle swarm optimization algorithm, ant colony optimization
algorithm, NSGA, and NSGA-II [38]–[43]. NSGA is pro-
posed by Srinivas and Deb [39] to deal with MOOPs, where
Goldberg’s nondomination criterion is used to determine solu-
tion ranks and fitness sharing is used to control the diversity of
solutions in the search space. To improve the high-level sensi-
tivity of NSGA to fitness sharing parameters, Deb et al. [44]
introduced NSGA-II which includes a second-order sorting
criterion called crowding distance and is faster and more
reliable than NSGA. NSGA-II has been demonstrated to be
among the most efficient algorithms for multiobjective opti-
mization on a number of benchmark problems [44], as it
has excellent search capability and flexibility [45]. Thus, we
selected NSGA-II to solve the application problem of response
task generation here.
NSGA II has good convergence toward the Pareto frontier
without losing the diversity of the solutions, which introduces
elitism into an evolutionary process and guarantees a diversity
preserving mechanism. At the start of NSGA II, an initial
population P0 is randomly generated. Then, objective function
values of the population P0 are evaluated and the two criteria
of each of the individual i’s in P0, rank irank and crowding
distance idistance, are calculated. After the initialization, the
program enters a while loop. In the loop, there are six steps.
1) Selecting parent individuals from Pt based on tourna-
ment selection strategy.
2) Generating offspring population Qt by crossover and
mutation operators.
3) Evaluating objective function values of the popula-
tion Qt.
4) Merging Pt and Qt to create Rt.
5) Calculating the two criteria (irank, idistance) for each of
the individual i in Rt.
6) Selecting the best individuals in Rt to generate Pt+1.
These steps are repeated until the stopping condition is met. In
the above steps, Pt is the original population, Qt is the newly
created population according to Pt, and Rt is the combination
of the populations of Pt and Qt. There are sophisticated algo-
rithms to calculate the domination rank irank and the crowding
distance idistance, such as described in [46], so that will not be
covered again here.
Then, according to the MOOP problem shown as (5)–(7),
the chromosome structure, genetic operations and optimal
solution selection from the Pareto solution are designed as
follows.
1) Chromosome Structure: The chromosome structure is
determined by the decision variable in the problem. According
to (7), each individual is coded as a binary vector X of
dimension
∑k
i=1 qi naturally, representing a decision vector.
2) Genetic Operations: Genetic operations are used to pro-
duce a new generation from an old generation. To effectively
reduce the amount of the potential solutions, the crossover
operator and the mutation operator are designed to meet the
constraint shown as (6b).
1) Crossover Operator: In this research, the arithmetic
crossover operator is used to produce offspring by swap-
ping genetic parts of the parents. Thus, crossover point
selection is key for the crossover operator. According
to (6b), each Xi should be regarded as an inte-
gral gene segment that cannot be divided. Therefore,
the set of alternative crossover points is {q1, q1 +
q2, . . . ,
∑i
j=1 qj, . . . ,
∑k−1
j=1 qj}. The crossover point is
randomly selected in the set, and the corresponding gene
segments are exchanged to generate the offspring.
2) Mutation Operator: In the mutation operator process, a
single bit in the parent string is flipped to create a new
offspring string. However, to meet the constraint shown
as (6b), first, a single bit randomly selected in the parent
string is flipped, resulting in two cases.
a) Case 1: If the selected bit is “0,” then in the
corresponding gene segment (Xi), the bit which
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Fig. 5. Architecture of the integrated scheduling component in Fig. 2.
is “1” is changed to 0, and the selected bit is
changed to 1.
b) Case 2: If the selected bit is 1, then the selected
bit is changed to 0, and a bit randomly selected in
the residual bits of the corresponding gene segment
(Xi) is changed to 1.
3) Optimal Solution: The optimal solution for a response
task set should be selected from the Pareto solution. In
the process of multiobjective optimization, there are three
optimization objectives: 1) security protection time; 2) com-
munication load; and 3) execution time. In the Pareto solution,
we select the optimal solution by making security protection
time the highest priority. First, the solution with the largest
security protection time in the Pareto solution is selected as
the optimal solution. As shown in Fig. 2, after combining the
response tasks with the system tasks, if the global system task
set is unschedulable, the solution with the second largest secu-
rity protection time in the Pareto solution is reselected as the
optimal solution. The following section introduces the task
schedule for the combination of the tasks.
IV. INTEGRATED SCHEDULING OF INTRUSION
RESPONSE FOR IASS
Response task set Tr will be executed with system task
set Tsys after it is generated. In this section, an integrated
scheduling scheme based on a DAG task model and GA is
proposed for IASs. The architecture of the integrated schedul-
ing is shown in Fig. 5. In the scheme initially, a global task
set is first generated through unified modeling of the response
tasks and system tasks. Then, global tasks are mapped and
scheduled based on a DAG task model and GA, to achieve a
scheduling table of each node of the system. During this pro-
cess, communication tasks in nodes can be regarded as system
tasks. Therefore, the communication scheduling table is also
determined. Finally, the system is reconfigured by updating
the scheduling tables to protect against cyberattacks.
A. System Model
As mentioned in Section II-B, an IAS is considered as a
system task set Tsys = {τi} and a node set N = {pi}; i =
1, . . . , m. The global task set T = {τi}; i = 1, . . . , n is c
combination of the system task set Tsys and the response task
Fig. 6. Example of the task model presented by DAG.
set Tr, i.e., T = Tr ∪ Tsys, where Tr = {tr1, . . . , tri , . . . , trk} and
tri = (ci, wi, cci, pti).
Task τi in the global task set is identified by the triples τi =
(wi, sti, pli), where wi is the worst execution time of the task,
sti is the start time of the task (relative to the start time of the
macro cycle), and pli is a list of the available node where the
task can be assigned. Meanwhile, to model the global task set,
a DAG is used to describe the dependent relationships among
the global tasks. The global task set is represented by a binary
group G = {T, E}, where T is the global task set, and E =
{ei,j|i, j = 1, . . . , n} is the set of directed arcs or edges between
the tasks to represent the dependency. The w(ei,j) represents
the communication load (data exchanged from τi to τj) per
one cycle time from τi to τj. The edge ei,j ∈ E represents the
dependent relationship that task τj cannot start the execution of
until task τi completes its execution. Fig. 6 shows an example
of the task model presented by DAG.
To facilitate constructing the DAG task model, the macro
cycle time (MCT) is defined as the least common multiple of
the cycle times of all the tasks in T and then all tasks can be
converted into the tasks with the same cycle time. For example,
assuming Tr ∪Tsys be {τ1, τ2, τ3} and the cycle times of these
tasks be 2, 4, and 4 ms, respectively, the MCT equals 4 ms,
and τ1 can be converted into two tasks whose cycle times are
4 ms. So, the parameter ci in tri can be ignored. The parameter
wi in tri is the same as wi in τi. The parameters cci and pti
are not used in the integrated scheduling, so they can also be
ignored. As the security services are usually not coupled with
any hardware, the pli of the tri equals N.
Define the concept of the prodromal task set Pred(τi) and
successive task set Succ(τi) as follows:
{
Pred(τi) = , If ej,i ∈ E τj ∈ 
Succ(τi) = , If ei,j ∈ E τj ∈ . (8)
If the prodromal task set is a null set, the corresponding task
is called a start task; if the successive task set is null set, the
corresponding task is called an end task. As shown in Fig. 6,
τ1 and τ2 are the start tasks, while τ8 and τ9 are the end tasks.
The prodromal task set of τ4 is {τ2, τ3} and the successive task
set of τ4 is {τ5, τ6}.
B. Task Mapping and Scheduling
As mentioned in Section IV-B, the global tasks are described
by triples τi = (wi, sti, pli) and the DAG model G. In the pro-
cess of the integrated task mapping scheduling, the following
constraints should be taken into account.
1) Coupling Relationship Between Tasks: For a specific
application in IASs, some tasks might need to run in
the same node. Besides, as described in Section IV-A,
the tasks which are converted from a same task must run
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in the same node. The coupling relationship between τi
and τj can be represented as: if τi runs in pk, τj also
runs in pk. In order to facilitate subsequent processing,
we assume the coupled tasks are adjacent to each other.
2) Dependent Relationship Between Tasks: The dependent
relationship between tasks is described by DAG, which
can be expressed as: if ei,j ∈ E, stj ≥ sti + wi.
3) Dependent Relationship Between Tasks and Nodes: For
a specific application in IASs, some tasks can only be
executed by specific nodes. For instance, a data acquisi-
tion task must run in the corresponding sensor node. In
task τi = (wi, sti, pli), pli lists the nodes in which the
task τi can run.
4) Communication Cost Constraint: The weight of the edge
in DAG w(ei,j) is used to express the communication
load from τi to τj. In IASs, the communication band-
width is limited, thus, we consider the communication
load of the system being the sum of the communication
load between nodes.
5) Load Constraint: In the process of task mapping, at least
one task should be assigned to each node.
IASs belong to distributed systems, and communication load
between nodes is an important index of the task mapping and
scheduling in distributed systems [47]. In our research, we
select the communication load as the optimization goal, and
formulate the task mapping and scheduling as an optimization
problem.
We used binary decision variable with two indices: Y = yi,j;
i = 1, 2, . . . , n; j = 1, 2, . . . m to denote the tasks mapping on
nodes, where yi,j is defined as follows:
yi,j =
{
1, if τi is mapped on pj
0, otherwise. (9)
Because one task can only be mapped to one node, the yi,j
must satisfy the following constraint:
m∑
j=1
yi,j = 1. (10)
Define a function Q(i, j) to denote whether two tasks are
mapped on the same node
Q(i, j) =
{
1; if τi and τj are mapped on the same node
0; otherwise.
(11)
And then, the communication load of the system can be
calculated as follows:
Comm =
∑
ei,j∈E
Q(i, j) × w(ei,j
)
. (12)
To solve the task mapping and scheduling problem by a GA,
the binary decision variables Y = {yi,j}; i = 1, 2, . . . , n; j =
1, 2, . . . m are used as the chromosome. The constraints 1) and
3) are satisfied by crossover and mutation operations, and the
constraints 2), 4), and 5) are used to delete illegal individuals
in the offspring population.
1) Crossover Operation: In the process of cross, Yi =
[yi,1, . . . , yi,j, . . . , yi,m] is regarded as a meta-segment to
Algorithm 1 Task Layering Algorithm Based on DAG in
Integrated Scheduling
Require: system task model DAG G
Ensure: task_level F = {F1, F2, . . . Ftask_level}
1: F1 = {}
2: for all τ such that τ ∈ T do
3: if Pred(τ) = NULL then
4: F1.appnd(τ)
5: end if
6: end for
7: while do
8: Ftmp = {}
9: for all τ such that τ ∈ Fi do
10: Ftmp = Ftmp ∪ Succ(τ)
11: end for
12: if Ftmp = NULL then
13: Break
14: else
15: Fi+1 = Ftmp
16: end if
17: end while
18: task_level = i + 1
19: for i = 1 to task_level − 1 do
20: Fi = ∪nj=i+1FjFi
21: end for
22: return task_level F = {F1, F2, . . . Ftask_level}
meet (10). Then meta-segments are recombined through
the single-point crossover to generate offspring, with the
available crossover point set being {1, 2, . . . , n}. To meet
constraint 1), numbers of the coupled tasks are removed
in the available crossover point set. For example, if
τ2–τ4 are coupled, then, 2 and 3 are removed in the
available crossover point set. Obviously, if the parents
meet constraint 3), the offspring also meets constraint 3).
2) Mutation Operation: To meet (10), operation is similar
to the mutation operation in Section III-B. To meet con-
straint 1), if τi and τj are coupled and Yi mutate, then,
let Yj equal Yi in each offspring.
After offspring population is generated by crossover and
mutation operations, it should be checked by constraints 2), 4),
and 5). For constraint 2), the dependent relationship between
tasks is represented by DAG. Obviously, the completion of
all the prodromal tasks of task τi is a necessary condition
for task τi to be started. Thus, tasks in the DAG are lay-
ered according to the dependent relationship in Algorithm 1.
task_level is the number of task layers, and Fi is the task
set to which the task belongs to the ith layer. Considering
the whole DAG, the sum execution time (SET) that all n
tasks execute on m nodes must not exceed the MCT. Then,
for each individual represented by Y , the SET can be cal-
culated based on the layered tasks in Algorithm 2, and the
start times ST of all tasks are also determined together. The
nt(i) is used to record the available time of the ith node. In
addition, it is easy to check each individual for constraints 4)
and 5). After the optimal solution is obtained, the decision
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Algorithm 2 Task Scheduling Algorithm in Integrated
Scheduling
Require: Y F = {F1, F2, . . . Ftask_level}
Ensure: ST = [st1, st2, . . . , stn] SET
1: [nt(1), nt(2), . . . , nt(m)] = [0, 0, . . . , 0]
2: for i = 1 to task_level − 1 do
3: Mi = Ni = {}
4: for all τ such that τ ∈ Fi do
5: if Succ(τk) = NULL then
6: Ni.append(τk)
7: else
8: Mi.append(τk)
9: end if
10: end for
11: sort(Mi(τ.w))
12: sort(Ni(τ.w))
13: for j = 1 to len(Mi) do
14: τ = Mi(τj)
15: τ.st = Max
τk∈Pred(τ)
(nt(P(τ)), (τk.st + τk.wk))
16: nt(P(τ)) = τ.st + τ.w
17: end for
18: for j = 1 to len(Ni) do
19: τ = Ni(τj)
20: τ.st = Max
τk∈Pred(τ)
(nt(P(τ)), (τk.st + τk.wk))
21: nt(P(τ)) = τ.st + τ.w
22: end for
23: end for
24: N = n∪
i=1 Ni
25: SET = Max
τk∈N
(τk.st + τk.wk)
26: return SET ST
variable Y and the start time vector of all tasks ST are deter-
mined, i.e., the new task schedule tables are generated. Then,
global task set T solution is not found, as shown in Fig. 2,
the response task set Tr will be reselected, which is described
in Section III-B.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, the proposed method is implemented based
on C++, and these simulations are carried out on a 2.6-GHz
Pentium 4 laptop with 2 GB RAM to analyze and evalu-
ate the performance and efficiency of the proposed real-time
intrusion response approach in IASs. Four numerical scenar-
ios are shown in Table II. As described in Section II-A, the
number of response tasks k represents the dimension of the
security policy. Table III shows the parameters predetermined
of the corresponding realization task sets for the simula-
tion. We suppose that the security policies are PScenario1 =
{S1, S2, S3, S4}, PScenario2 = {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}, PScenario3 =
{S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}, and PScenario4 = {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5} for the
four scenarios, respectively. Table IV shows the parameters
of the system task set for the simulation. In scenario 1, the
system task set is {τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4, τ5, τ6}; in scenario 2, the
system task set is {τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4, τ5}; in scenario 3, the sys-
tem task set is {τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4, τ5, τ6, τ7, τ8, τ9, τ10}; and in
TABLE II
PARAMETERS OF THE FOUR SCENARIOS
scenario 4, all tasks are used and tasks τ1–τ10 are used twice.
The DAGs are randomly generated based on the corresponding
task sets.
A. Analysis of the Response Tasks Generation
During the process of the response tasks generation, the
Pareto solution of the response task set is generated through
NSGA II, and then the optimal solution of the response
task set is selected according to the principle described in
Section III-B.
There are two main performance metrics for response task
generation based on multiobjective optimization: 1) conver-
gence to the Pareto optimal front and 2) the maintenance of
a diverse set of solutions. Fig. 7(a) shows the Pareto solu-
tion fronts of response task generation in scenarios 1 and 2
at the 50th simulation step, and the relations between each
pair of the three optimization objectives of the Pareto opti-
mal are presented in Fig. 7(b)–(d). They show the tradeoff
among security protection time, sum of communication loads
of the response tasks, and sum of execution times of the
response tasks. After selecting the optimal solution in the
Pareto solutions, the result for the response task set gener-
ation in scenario 1 is TrScenario1 = {r11, r22, r32, r43}, and the
results for the response task set generation in scenario 2 is
TrScenario2 = {r11, r22, r32, r43, r52}. The optimization solutions
of the response task set generation are associated with the
given security policy and the realization task sets, but not
with the system task set and system nodes. Thus, Pareto opti-
mal fronts of scenarios 2–4 are the same. Based on the above
results, it can be seen that the Pareto solution of the response
tasks generation are convergent and the Pareto solution fronts
uniformly scattered.
B. Analysis of the Integrated Scheduling
The global system tasks (including response tasks and sys-
tem tasks) are mapped and scheduled synthetically through
GA based on the DAG model. Fig. 8 shows the variation of
the fitness (communication load) for four scenarios during the
genetic computation. It is found that all the individuals have
reached almost the same fitness value after about ten gen-
erations for the four scenarios, which indicates that GA has
reached the optimal solution after about ten generations. In
Fig. 8, we can infer that the appropriate generation number of
GA in the integrated scheduling module depends not only on
the number of tasks but also on the number of the nodes in
the system. This is mainly because the number of gene bits is
determined by the product of the task number and the node
number.
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TABLE III
REALIZATION TASK SETS FOR SIMULATIONS
TABLE IV
PARAMETERS OF SYSTEM TASK SET FOR THE SIMULATION
Table V shows the results of the task mapping and
scheduling for the four scenarios when set the related
parameters are set as follows: initial_population = 100 and
num_generation = 20. The results show that all tasks can
be completed in one MCT, which means that all tasks are
schedulable satisfying all constraints, and the execution of the
response tasks has no effect on the system tasks. This demon-
strates that the proposed method can achieve instant intrusion
response.
C. Real-Time Performance Evaluation
The proposed approach aims to guarantee the smooth online
enforcement of a security policy. On the other hand, the intru-
sion response that includes the proposed approach is also
implemented as a task, so the execution time needs to be eval-
uated. Thus, we must consider the real-time performance of
the proposed approach. To evaluate the real-time performance,
130 repeated tests for the four scenarios are carried out. Fig. 9
shows the real-time performance of the proposed approach of
intrusion response based on task scheduling and optimization
for the four scenarios in the repeated tests. It can be seen
that the execution times of the proposed method for all four
scenarios are less than 60 ms. The mean values are 14.82,
26.50, 26.58, and 46.28 ms, respectively. This is because the
number of the gene bits in the response task set generation
based on NSGA is
∑k
i=1 qk and the number of the gene bits
in the integrated scheduling based on GA is m ∗ n. These two
parameters are the important factors influencing the execu-
tion times of the proposed method. These results show that
the proposed algorithm can be executed in a short time. It
also means that a system can respond quickly to any cyber
attacks.
VI. SIMULATION—SIMPLIFIED TEP CONTROL SYSTEM
To further verify the effects and feasibility of the pro-
posed approach of intrusion response in real-application sys-
tems, in this section, we construct a simulation environment
based on OPEN and MATLAB, and a simplified Tennessee
Eastman process (TEP) control system is used to carry out
the simulations.
A. Simulation Setup
1) Simplified TEP and Simulation System: We used a
simplified TEP control system as Ricker [48] described to
carry out the simulations. The simplified TEP control sys-
tem is a chemical reactor plant and has been previously used
in [49] and [50]. In the chemical process, two reactants, A
and C, are used to generate the product D, while B is an inert
product. The schematic of the simplified TEP control system
is shown in Fig. 10. More details on the simplified TEP can
be found in [49] and [50].
In the simulation, we focused on a field control system
for industrial automation and do not consider links to the
outside networks. The simplified TEP control system in an
OPNET environment is shown in Fig. 11. The physical pro-
cess is simulated in the MATLAB environment, and the control
component is implemented in an OPNET environment. This
simplified TEP model and the associated multiloop PI control
law proposed in [48] are used. The communication network
is a controller area network (CAN) bus, which is also imple-
mented in the OPNET environment. The model of the physical
process is called an agent node (PA in Fig. 11) in OPNET.
The simulation system contains one master node (MN) and
five slave nodes (one plant agent node and four controller
nodes). All nodes are connected to a CAN bus to exchange
messages.
Based on the above simulation system, the dynamic security
protection shown in Fig. 1 is implemented. It is important to
note that this paper focuses on security policy enforcement,
thus the rest of the dynamic security protection is only real-
ized in a simple way. An intrusion detection module is used
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 7. Pareto solutions of the MOOP for the response task set generation in
the scenarios. (a) Pareto optimal fronts in scenarios 1 and 2. Relation between
(b) ET and CC, (c) CC and PT, and (d) ET and PT.
to generate a security policy online that is used for the input
to the security policy enforcement. The intrusion detection
module can generate an integer that ranges between 0 and 3.
0 represents no cyberattack, while “1,” “2,” and “3” represent
three types of cyberattacks. The intrusion detection module is
implemented in all the nodes and used to simulate the intru-
sion detection component of Fig. 1. The intrusion response
module contains two parts: 1) security policy decision and
2) security policy enforcement, which is implemented in the
MN. To implement the security policy decision, each type of
attack corresponds to a security policy P. The parameters of
the security policies are predetermined, and are presented in
Fig. 8. Convergence of the proposed integrated scheduling-based GA for the
four scenarios.
Fig. 9. Real-time performance for four scenarios.
Table VI. The proposed method of security policy enforce-
ment is also implemented according to the descriptions in
Sections III and IV. The process models of the MN node
and the other nodes are presented in Fig. 12. In the MN, the
DETECT process contains one task, i.e., intrusion detection,
and the RESPONSE process also contains only one task, i.e.,
intrusion response. The CAN_TX and CAN_RX processes are
responsible for the network communication for the node. The
other tasks are in the APP process. Because we only con-
sider the execution time of intrusion detection in this paper,
in other nodes (slave nodes), a useless task is used to simu-
late the real-intrusion detection in the DETECT process. The
APP, CAN_TX, and CAN_RX processes are these processes in
the MN. As shown in Fig. 2, the updated scheduling tables
are broadcasted through the CAN bus after they are changed.
All nodes are reconfigured according to the corresponding
scheduling tables.
2) Parameter Configuration: Table VI shows the system
tasks of the simplified TEP control system. The execution
times of these tasks are obtained by estimation, according to
the corresponding code. The periods ci and the pli are deter-
mined by the application. In the intrusion detection task, some
dummy code is inserted to simulate the execution time of the
real-intrusion detection. In practice, the PA node is nonexis-
tent, as it is only for communication between the physical
system and the control system. Thus, the PA node and its
tasks are not considered in the following simulations. To facil-
itate understanding, we label the nodes MN, FC, PC1, PC2,
and CC for the simulation system shown in Fig. 11 as p1–p5,
respectively.
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TABLE V
RESULT OF TASK MAPPING AND SCHEDULING FOR THE FOUR SCENARIOS
Fig. 10. Schematic of the simplified TEP control system.
Fig. 11. Simplified TEP control system in OPNET environment.
The decision table for the security policy is designed as
follows: when there is no attack, the security policy P is
an empty set; when an attack of Type 1 occurs, the secu-
rity policy is PType1 = {S1, S2}; when an attack of Type 2
occurs, the security policy is PType2 = {S1, S3}; for a Type 3
attack, the security policy is PType3 = {S1, S2, S3}. This
means that the response tasks are generated from the cor-
responding security policy P. The security services S1–S3
TABLE VI
PARAMETERS OF SYSTEM TASKS IN THE
SIMPLIFIED TEP CONTROL SYSTEM
that are used in the security policy can be implemented
by the corresponding realization task sets R1–R3, respec-
tively. The parameters of the realization tasks are given in
Table VII. These realization tasks are prestored as functions in
the nodes.
B. Simulation Results
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed method in
the simulation system, the intrusion detection component
generates the following output:
Output =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, t ∈ [0, 10) ∪ [70, 100)
1, t ∈ [10, 30)
2, t ∈ [30, 50)
3, t ∈ [50, 70).
(13)
Table VIII shows the Pareto solution for the response task
set generation for t = 50. As described in Section III-B, the
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TABLE VII
REALIZATION TASK SETS OF THE THREE SECURITY SERVICES
TABLE VIII
PARETO SOLUTION FOR THE RESPONSE TASK SET GENERATION FOR t = 50
(a)
(b)
Fig. 12. Process models of the (a) MN and the (b) slave node in OPNET.
optimal response task set is the one with the largest security
protection time in the Pareto solution. Thus, the optimal solu-
tion of the response task set generation is Tr = {r11, r23, r32}.
Fig. 13. Comparison of dynamic response yF of the simplified TEP control
system.
Then, through the integrated scheduling module, we can
obtain the optimal solution of the integrated task mapping
and the corresponding task scheduling table. Due to limited
space, Table IX only shows the integrated task mapping and
the corresponding task scheduling table for tasks reconfigured
for t = 50. The result shows that all tasks (including system
tasks and response tasks) are schedulable, and the sum of the
execution times of all the nodes does not exceed the MCT
(3000 ms). It also means that response tasks can successfully
be carried out with no effect on the execution of the system
tasks.
Table IX shows the execution of all the tasks from the per-
spective of task scheduling. Control performance is also an
important factor for IASs. From the perspective of control
engineering, it should also be guaranteed that the execution
of a security policy will have no effect on the control per-
formance of the system. Fig. 13 provides a comparison of
dynamic response yF between the normal simplified TEP con-
trol system and the system with dynamic security protection. It
clearly shows that the dynamic security protection has almost
no influence on the dynamic response of the simplified TEP
control system.
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TABLE IX
RESULT OF TASK MAPPING AND SCHEDULING FOR t = 50
In the above simulations, there are three different security
policies. This is because the proposed approach of intrusion
response can be clearly explained based on these configura-
tions, and security policy decision is not the focus of this paper.
In real-dynamic security protection of IASs, security policies
generated from the security policy decision is complex and
varied. From the above simulation results, it can be seen that
the proposed real-time control approach of intrusion response
is an effective method to guarantee the smooth, timely exe-
cution of the security policy without effect on system control
performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
Timely intrusion detection and response is the key idea for
online security protection for IASs. In this paper, we proposed
a general real-time control approach based on table-driven task
scheduling of intrusion response for IASs, which utilizes TBS
criteria and integrates the response tasks and system tasks into
the scheduling and optimization after consideration of a num-
ber of requirements. First, to meet the wide variety of security
requirements for security protection of IASs, the security pol-
icy is formalized as a group of security services with different
types. Each type of security service can be realized by many
tasks, and these compose the realization task set for the cor-
responding security service. The response tasks are generated
through an NSGA-II algorithm according to the security pol-
icy. Then, to mitigate the execution of the response tasks, an
integrated scheduling strategy based on the GA is designed to
map and schedule the system tasks and response tasks together.
The proposed method has been implemented using the C++
language and analyzed on several synthetic applications. Then,
a simplified TEP control system was used to further verify
the effectiveness of the proposed method in dynamic secu-
rity protection based on OPNET and MATLAB environments.
Simulation results have shown that the given security policy
can be smoothly implemented and achieve the instant intrusion
response without effect on the normal operation of the system.
Currently, all nodes are considered as homogeneous. In fact,
there are also many heterogeneous nodes in most IASs. Further
improvement to this paper can be made by considering the
inclusion of heterogeneous node. In addition, this paper focused
on security policy enforcement, and did not discuss security
policy generation. Therefore, security policy generation based
on decision theory of intrusion response will be considered.
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A General Real-Time Control Approach of Intrusion
Response for Industrial Automation Systems
Shuang Huang, Chunjie Zhou, Naixue Xiong, Senior Member, IEEE, Shuang-Hua Yang, Senior Member, IEEE,
Yuanqing Qin, and Qi Zhang
Abstract—Intrusion response is a critical part of security
protection. Compared with IT systems, industrial automation
systems (IASs) have greater timeliness and availability demands.
Real-time security policy enforcement of intrusion response is
a challenge facing intrusion response for IASs. Inappropriate
enforcement of the security policy can influence normal opera-
tion of the control system, and the loss caused by this security
policy may even exceed that caused by cyberattacks. However,
existing research about intrusion response focuses on security pol-
icy decisions and ignores security policy execution. This paper
proposes a general, real-time control approach based on table-
driven scheduling of intrusion response in IASs to address the
problem of security policy execution. Security policy consists of
a security service group, with each type of security service sup-
ported by a realization task set. Realization tasks from several
task sets can be combined to form a response task set. In the
proposed approach, first, a response task set is generated by a
nondominated sorting genetic algorithm (GA) II with joint con-
sideration of security performance and cost. Then, the system is
reconfigured through an integrated scheduling scheme where sys-
tem tasks and response tasks are mapped and scheduled together
based on a GA. Furthermore, results from both numerical simu-
lations and a real-application simulation show that the proposed
method can implement the security policy in time with little effect
on the system.
Index Terms—Industrial automation, intrusion response, secu-
rity protection, task scheduling.
I. INTRODUCTION
MODERN industrial automation systems (IASs) are com-posed of physical plants that perform the physical
processes and networks of embedded computers that perform
the computational processes necessary to monitor and con-
trol the physical processes [1]. IASs are extensively applied
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in national economical industrial fields, such as water treat-
ment, chemical processing, oil and natural gas distribution,
and smart grids, which are at the core of critical infrastruc-
tures [2]–[5]. With the wide application of information and
communication technologies to IASs and the rapid growth
of viruses in IASs [6], [7], improving security protection has
become a critical task that system designers must face [1], [8].
Security protection of IASs emphasizes the concept of
in-depth defense [9]. Security protection provided by field
devices is the last defense of the in-depth defense; it provides
intrinsic security for field control systems. Much research
about security protection integrated control theory for field
control systems has been presented [10], [11], and some litera-
ture has studied the security protection at the field control layer
from the perspective of software implementation [12]–[14].
As the workflow of process industry automation is coherent,
security protection of process industry automation should be
done from a perspective of whole system. In addition to
other security mechanisms such as industrial firewalls and
intrusion detection and response are also two key elements
of the dynamic security protection of IASs [6], [15], [16].
Research working in the field of security protection of IASs
is focusing on intrusion detection technology [5], [17]–[20].
Comparatively, there are few studies about intrusion response
of industrial automation [21]–[23].
Intrusion response systems (IRSs) can be classified into
three types: 1) manual IRSs; 2) semiautomatic IRSs; and
3) automatic IRSs. IASs have high availability demands, which
means the manual and the semi-automatic intrusion response
will not meet the security protection requirements for IASs.
Automatic intrusion response has been a research topic in the
IT domain for several years. Foo et al. [24] presented an
automated response mechanism in an intrusion tolerant sys-
tem, called ADEPTS, which uses a graph of intrusion goals
(I-GRAPH) as the underlying representation in the system.
Zonouz et al. [21] proposed a new approach about automated
intrusion response called RRE which can analyze undesired
security events and their countermeasures based on attack-
response trees. Fessi et al. [23] designed a multiattribute
genetic algorithm (GA) approach for handling a multiattribute
decision problem in intrusion response. These works focus
on security policy decision and ignore the security policy
execution, i.e., instant intrusion response.
In intrusion response, a security policy contains many dif-
ferent types of security services. Furthermore, in dynamic
security protection, security policy changes in real-time [15].
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For example, in a certain situation, a security policy generated
by a security policy decision is composed of an encryption
service and an access control service. When the attack sit-
uation changes, a security policy decision may generate a
new security policy that is composed of access control ser-
vices only. Each type of security service can be implemented
by various realization tasks. For instance, the encryption ser-
vice can be realized by many cryptographic algorithms, such
as Rivest Shamir Adlemen (RSA), Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4),
or data encrypt standard (DES). Therefore, the response task
set generated from a security policy is also changing in real-
time. On the other hand, system tasks of IASs have real-time
characteristics. They are simple and fixed, and these tasks are
generally scheduled by table-driven scheduling algorithms to
achieve predictable behaviors [25], [26]. Thus, to execute a
security policy in IASs, response tasks cannot be treated in a
simple way (such as simply consider them as new, high priority
tasks). Execution of the security policy without any counter-
measures may affect the system task behaviors and the normal
operation of the system [27]. For example, a security policy is
composed of an encryption service that is realized by a task. If
this task is executed without considering the execution of other
tasks in the system, it may affect the real-time performance of
these other tasks or make some tasks unable to be executed
smoothly within the required time. The loss caused by inap-
propriate execution of a security policy may even be more than
that caused by cyberattacks. IASs are quite different from IT
systems in some ways. IASs have an inherent character of real-
time response and determinacy that is embodied by real-time
tasks and communication. In time-based security (TBS) the-
ory, security is defined as a system that can detect and respond
to cyberattacks before security threats happen or reach the tar-
get system [28], [29], i.e., timeliness is the key issue of online
security protection.
Task scheduling is an important guarantee of effective
task execution [30], [31]. There is some literature available
to research task scheduling and optimization with multicon-
straints [32]–[34]. Liu et al. [33] proposed a novel security
constraint model based on the formulation of a scheduling prob-
lem for work-flow applications in distributed data-intensive
computing environments. Saleh and Dong [34] designed a
real-time multiagent design model and proposed an adaptive
security-aware scheduling system that is combined with secu-
rity service enhancement. These methods are designed for IT
systems, and security requirements are regarded as constraints.
They leave intrusion response tasks out of consideration.
System tasks in IASs are generally simple and fixed, which
are very different from the tasks in IT systems and are usually
scheduled by table-driven scheduling algorithms [25], [26].
In this paper, we propose a general real-time control
approach based on table-driven task scheduling of intrusion
response in IASs. In this approach, the response tasks and
system tasks are integrated into the task scheduling table
with various requirements being considered to achieve instant
intrusion response to cyberattacks. First, through a multiobjec-
tive optimization method based on the nondominated sorting
GA II (NSGA-II), an intrusion response task set is gener-
ated from the security policy with consideration of security
Fig. 1. Dynamic security protection model for IASs.
performance and cost in IASs. Second, a unified task model is
conducted based on the combination of the intrusion response
task set and a system task set. A distributed table-driven
task scheduling and optimization scheme based on a GA
and directed acyclic graph (DAG) is designed to update the
task scheduling tables. Then, the system is reconfigured by
updating the task scheduling tables to ensure the execution of
intrusion response tasks and the normal operation of system
functions. At last, the effectiveness of the proposed approach is
verified by numerical simulations and application simulations
based on a real-application system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the real-time issue of intrusion response in IASs is presented,
and then a general real-time control architecture of intru-
sion response that contains response task set generation and
integrated scheduling is proposed. Section III designs a multi-
objective optimization method for response task set generation
based on a given security policy. Integrated scheduling and
optimization for the combination of the response task set and
the system task set is presented by using a GA in Section IV.
Sections V and VI show numerical simulations and applica-
tion simulations, respectively. Finally, the study is concluded
in Section VII with a summary of the research undertaken and
plans for future research.
II. REAL-TIME CONTROL ISSUE OF INTRUSION
RESPONSE FOR IASS
A. Problem Description
IASs are characterized by real-time and high reliability [35].
Meanwhile, IASs are industrial production systems and are
safety critical systems. They should be able to defend them-
selves against the complicated and changing cyberattacks at
runtime, i.e., they need to have dynamic security protection.
The dynamic security protection for IASs is essential against
cyberattacks [15]. Fig. 1 shows a general dynamic secu-
rity protection model for IASs. Dynamic security protection
of IASs consists of two parts: 1) intrusion detection and
2) intrusion response. Intrusion response is responsible for
security policy decision and security policy enforcement.
The security policy is generated at the security policy deci-
sion phase [22], while the security policy is interpreted and
executed in the systems at the security policy enforcement
phase.
Generally, a security policy is composed of differ-
ent kinds of security services forming a security service
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group (SSG) [36], and each type of security service can be
implemented by various realization tasks. Thus, in the pro-
cess of dynamic security protection, real-time security policies
can be interpreted as different numbers and different types of
response tasks that can take up system resources, such as com-
munication bandwidth, CPU time, and memory. Therefore,
the enforcement of these response tasks may disrupt the sys-
tem task scheduling and affect the system’s normal operation.
On the other hand, the response tasks generated from secu-
rity policy directly determine the security performance of
IRSs. Consequently, an integrated real-time task enforcement
approach of intrusion response for IASs is needed to ensure
the smooth and efficient enforcement of security policy and
the system’s normal operation.
In this paper, we focus on the security policy enforce-
ment component of intrusion response for IASs. A general
real-time table-driven task scheduling approach of intrusion
response is designed to solve this problem, where response
tasks and system tasks are scheduled and optimized together
with consideration of multiple constraints in IASs. The
response tasks are generated dynamically according to a
security policy, which are used to realize security services
in the security policy. The system tasks include functional
tasks and other nonfunctional (not pertaining to security)
tasks.
B. Formalizing the Problem
An IAS is considered as a combination of a system task set
Tsys and a node set N = {pi}. Suppose that the system tasks
are dependent, nonpreemptible periodic tasks, and all nodes in
the node set N to be homogenous. IASs nodes include control
devices, intelligent sensors, and intelligent actuators. Let P
represent a given security policy, and as mentioned above,
the security policy can be regarded as an SSG composed of
different kinds of security services [36]. So the security policy
P can be formalized as
P = {S1, . . . , Si, . . . , Sk} (1)
where Si is a security service and can be realized by many
realization tasks, that is
Si  Ri =
{
ri1, ri2, . . . , riqi
} (2)
where Ri is the realization task set of security service Si. For
example, the encryption service is a security service, which
can be realized by many cryptographic algorithms, such as
RSA, RC4, and DES. The parameters of a response task set Ri
are obtained offline. In this paper, we focus on security policy
enforcement of IRSs based on a given security policy [shown
as (1)], and do not discuss security policy decisions. Define
Tr is the response task set that is generated from security pol-
icy P = {S1, . . . , Si, . . . , Sk}, and the global task set T is used
to represent the combination of the response task set Tr and
the system task set Tsys. For easy of understanding, the nota-
tions and their meanings used in this paper are summarized in
Table I.
TABLE I
DEFINITIONS OF NOTATIONS
Fig. 2. Real-time control architecture of intrusion response for IASs.
C. Real-Time Control Architecture of Intrusion
Response for IASs
To ensure enforcement of the intrusion response of IASs,
a real-time control approach of intrusion response based on
table-driven task scheduling and optimization is proposed,
which is shown in Fig. 2.
As shown in Fig. 2, the intrusion detection and the secu-
rity policy decision components are executed periodically,
and the security policy generated from the security policy
decision component is the real-time input of security policy
enforcement component. This is a two-stage process contain-
ing response task set generation and integrated scheduling.
In the response task set generation stage, with consideration
of security performance requirements and time constraints,
the Pareto solution of a response task set is generated from the
security policy through the NSGA-II. Then, a solution in
the form of a response task set having the highest security
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Fig. 3. Flowchart of task scheduling and optimization.
performance in the Pareto solution is selected as the opti-
mal response task set. In the integrated scheduling stage, the
response task set Tr is first combined with system task set
Tsys to generate the global system task set T . Then, based on
a DAG, a GA-based task scheduler is used to reconfigure the
global system scheduling tables. If the global system task set is
unschedulable, the response task set with slightly lower secu-
rity performance will be re-elected as the optimizing response
task set. The flowchart of the task scheduling and optimization
is shown in Fig. 3.
III. RESPONSE TASK SET GENERATION OF
INTRUSION RESPONSE FOR IASS
In this section, a response task set generation scheme of
intrusion response is presented. We first model the problems
of response task set generation, then we solve this problem
using NSGA-II.
A. Modeling the Problem
The realization task rij is defined as rij = (cij, wij, ccij, ptij),
where cij and wij are the cycle time and (worst case) execu-
tion time of the realization task rij, respectively. ccij is defined
as the communication load of the realization task rij, which
is represented as the byte count of the exchanged data of the
realization task rij in one period time cij. ptij is the security
protection time that the realization task rij can provide, which
means the duration time that the attacker is able to achieve
an attack goal in the system when the realization task rij is
employed [28], [29]. Thus, ptij of the rij is different for the dif-
ferent types of attacks. The first three parameters of the rij can
be determined in advance through evaluation [31], [36], [37],
while the ptij of the rij for each type of attack can be listed
online and determined in a security policy decision. It is impor-
tant to note that heterogeneous processors are not considered
here, i.e., all processors are treated the same.
Fig. 4. TBS protection.
Then, the response task set Tr = {tr1, . . . , tri , . . . , trk} is gen-
erated from the security policy P = {S1, . . . , Si, . . . , Sk}. Each
individual response task tri is chosen from the corresponding
realization task set Ri. Thus, a security policy may have dif-
ferent security performances because a security policy can be
realized by different SSGs that may have different security
performances. For instance, the security performance of two
cryptographic algorithms (e.g., RSA and DES) is obviously
different. Security performance can be measured by time, i.e.,
TBS theory [28]. Security is defined as an intrusion attack
that is detected and responded to in time [28], [29]. Thus,
systems must be recovered before attackers achieve their intru-
sion goals. As shown in Fig. 4, security is formalized as
follows:
PT > Dett + Rest (3)
where PT is the security protection time provided by the SSG,
Dett and Rest are the intrusion detection time and the intrusion
response time, respectively. The latter two parameters can be
considered as constants for a specific system. Security time
margin (STM) is defined as the difference between PT and
Dett + Rest, i.e., STM = PT − (Dett + Rest). Thus, STM ≤ 0
represents a system that is insecure, while STM > 0 rep-
resents a system that is secure. The STM can represent the
security level.
For competition reasons, many intelligent devices at field
control layer in IASs are implemented based on embedded sys-
tems, where the CPU performance, communication bandwidth,
and memory size of IASs are designed according to rather
limited requirements. Because of the business competition in
IASs, cost is an important factor that must be considered
during design and implementation. Most intelligent devices
at the field control layer in IASs are implemented based on
embedded systems, where the CPU performance, communi-
cation bandwidth, and memory size are designed according
to rather limited requirements. Thus, in this paper, the IRS is
constructed under certain resource constraints. In addition, the
IRS is used to mitigate the effect of a cyberattack and pro-
tect system functions, which are implemented in IAS nodes.
Thus, IAS nodes share the CPU resources and communica-
tion bus with the IRS, which requires that the response tasks
of the IRS always affects the system’s normal operation. So,
the response tasks of IRS should be considered together with
system function tasks to mitigate impacts of the IRS on system
functions.
Therefore, three optimization goals should be considered in
the process of the response task set generation: security per-
formance, the communication load and execution time of task.
Let a decision variable xij denote whether the jth realization
task in realization task set Ri is selected to implement the
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ith security service Si, and X = (X1, . . . , Xi, . . . , Xk), where
Xi = (xi1, . . . , xij, . . . , xiqi)
xij =
{
1, rij is selected
0, rij is not selected
(4)
xij should satisfy the following constraint:
∑qi
j=1 xij = 1.
Then, the security protection time of the response task
set Tr = {tr1, . . . , tri , . . . , trk} can be calculated as PT =∑k
i=1
∑qi
j=1 xijptij. The communication load per unit of time
of the response task rij is ccij/cij and the communication
load of the response task set can be represented as CC =∑k
i=1
∑qi
j=1 (xijccij/cij). Analogously, the sum of the execu-
tion times of the response tasks in the response task set can
be represented as ET = ∑ki=1
∑qi
j=1 (xijwij/cij). Meanwhile, as
shown in Fig. 4, to ensure that the system is secure, the fol-
lowing constraint must be satisfied: PT ≥ (Dett + Rest), with
Dett and Rest considered as constants for a specific system.
To generate the response task set Tr the problem is formal-
ized as a multiobjective optimization problem (MOOP). The
objective functions of this MOOP model are stated as
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Min ET =
k∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
xijwij/cij
Min CC =
k∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
xijccij/cij
Max PT =
k∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
xijptij.
(5)
And the constraints of the MOOP model are expressed as
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
PT > (Dett + Rest) (6a)
qi∑
j=1
xij = 1. (6b)
Meanwhile, the decision variable is represented as
X = (X1, . . . , Xi, . . . , Xk) (7)
where Xi = (xi1, . . . , xij, . . . , xiqi). Then, the problem of
response task set generation can be formalized as (5) and (6).
B. Using the NSGA-II to Solve the MOOP Problem
Many evolutionary algorithms have been developed to solve
MOOP problems, such as simulated annealing algorithm, par-
ticle swarm optimization algorithm, ant colony optimization
algorithm, NSGA, and NSGA-II [38]–[43]. NSGA is pro-
posed by Srinivas and Deb [39] to deal with MOOPs, where
Goldberg’s nondomination criterion is used to determine solu-
tion ranks and fitness sharing is used to control the diversity of
solutions in the search space. To improve the high-level sensi-
tivity of NSGA to fitness sharing parameters, Deb et al. [44]
introduced NSGA-II which includes a second-order sorting
criterion called crowding distance and is faster and more
reliable than NSGA. NSGA-II has been demonstrated to be
among the most efficient algorithms for multiobjective opti-
mization on a number of benchmark problems [44], as it
has excellent search capability and flexibility [45]. Thus, we
selected NSGA-II to solve the application problem of response
task generation here.
NSGA II has good convergence toward the Pareto frontier
without losing the diversity of the solutions, which introduces
elitism into an evolutionary process and guarantees a diversity
preserving mechanism. At the start of NSGA II, an initial
population P0 is randomly generated. Then, objective function
values of the population P0 are evaluated and the two criteria
of each of the individual i’s in P0, rank irank and crowding
distance idistance, are calculated. After the initialization, the
program enters a while loop. In the loop, there are six steps.
1) Selecting parent individuals from Pt based on tourna-
ment selection strategy.
2) Generating offspring population Qt by crossover and
mutation operators.
3) Evaluating objective function values of the popula-
tion Qt.
4) Merging Pt and Qt to create Rt.
5) Calculating the two criteria (irank, idistance) for each of
the individual i in Rt.
6) Selecting the best individuals in Rt to generate Pt+1.
These steps are repeated until the stopping condition is met. In
the above steps, Pt is the original population, Qt is the newly
created population according to Pt, and Rt is the combination
of the populations of Pt and Qt. There are sophisticated algo-
rithms to calculate the domination rank irank and the crowding
distance idistance, such as described in [46], so that will not be
covered again here.
Then, according to the MOOP problem shown as (5)–(7),
the chromosome structure, genetic operations and optimal
solution selection from the Pareto solution are designed as
follows.
1) Chromosome Structure: The chromosome structure is
determined by the decision variable in the problem. According
to (7), each individual is coded as a binary vector X of
dimension
∑k
i=1 qi naturally, representing a decision vector.
2) Genetic Operations: Genetic operations are used to pro-
duce a new generation from an old generation. To effectively
reduce the amount of the potential solutions, the crossover
operator and the mutation operator are designed to meet the
constraint shown as (6b).
1) Crossover Operator: In this research, the arithmetic
crossover operator is used to produce offspring by swap-
ping genetic parts of the parents. Thus, crossover point
selection is key for the crossover operator. According
to (6b), each Xi should be regarded as an inte-
gral gene segment that cannot be divided. Therefore,
the set of alternative crossover points is {q1, q1 +
q2, . . . ,
∑i
j=1 qj, . . . ,
∑k−1
j=1 qj}. The crossover point is
randomly selected in the set, and the corresponding gene
segments are exchanged to generate the offspring.
2) Mutation Operator: In the mutation operator process, a
single bit in the parent string is flipped to create a new
offspring string. However, to meet the constraint shown
as (6b), first, a single bit randomly selected in the parent
string is flipped, resulting in two cases.
a) Case 1: If the selected bit is “0,” then in the
corresponding gene segment (Xi), the bit which
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Fig. 5. Architecture of the integrated scheduling component in Fig. 2.
is “1” is changed to 0, and the selected bit is
changed to 1.
b) Case 2: If the selected bit is 1, then the selected
bit is changed to 0, and a bit randomly selected in
the residual bits of the corresponding gene segment
(Xi) is changed to 1.
3) Optimal Solution: The optimal solution for a response
task set should be selected from the Pareto solution. In
the process of multiobjective optimization, there are three
optimization objectives: 1) security protection time; 2) com-
munication load; and 3) execution time. In the Pareto solution,
we select the optimal solution by making security protection
time the highest priority. First, the solution with the largest
security protection time in the Pareto solution is selected as
the optimal solution. As shown in Fig. 2, after combining the
response tasks with the system tasks, if the global system task
set is unschedulable, the solution with the second largest secu-
rity protection time in the Pareto solution is reselected as the
optimal solution. The following section introduces the task
schedule for the combination of the tasks.
IV. INTEGRATED SCHEDULING OF INTRUSION
RESPONSE FOR IASS
Response task set Tr will be executed with system task
set Tsys after it is generated. In this section, an integrated
scheduling scheme based on a DAG task model and GA is
proposed for IASs. The architecture of the integrated schedul-
ing is shown in Fig. 5. In the scheme initially, a global task
set is first generated through unified modeling of the response
tasks and system tasks. Then, global tasks are mapped and
scheduled based on a DAG task model and GA, to achieve a
scheduling table of each node of the system. During this pro-
cess, communication tasks in nodes can be regarded as system
tasks. Therefore, the communication scheduling table is also
determined. Finally, the system is reconfigured by updating
the scheduling tables to protect against cyberattacks.
A. System Model
As mentioned in Section II-B, an IAS is considered as a
system task set Tsys = {τi} and a node set N = {pi}; i =
1, . . . , m. The global task set T = {τi}; i = 1, . . . , n is c
combination of the system task set Tsys and the response task
Fig. 6. Example of the task model presented by DAG.
set Tr, i.e., T = Tr ∪ Tsys, where Tr = {tr1, . . . , tri , . . . , trk} and
tri = (ci, wi, cci, pti).
Task τi in the global task set is identified by the triples τi =
(wi, sti, pli), where wi is the worst execution time of the task,
sti is the start time of the task (relative to the start time of the
macro cycle), and pli is a list of the available node where the
task can be assigned. Meanwhile, to model the global task set,
a DAG is used to describe the dependent relationships among
the global tasks. The global task set is represented by a binary
group G = {T, E}, where T is the global task set, and E =
{ei,j|i, j = 1, . . . , n} is the set of directed arcs or edges between
the tasks to represent the dependency. The w(ei,j) represents
the communication load (data exchanged from τi to τj) per
one cycle time from τi to τj. The edge ei,j ∈ E represents the
dependent relationship that task τj cannot start the execution of
until task τi completes its execution. Fig. 6 shows an example
of the task model presented by DAG.
To facilitate constructing the DAG task model, the macro
cycle time (MCT) is defined as the least common multiple of
the cycle times of all the tasks in T and then all tasks can be
converted into the tasks with the same cycle time. For example,
assuming Tr ∪Tsys be {τ1, τ2, τ3} and the cycle times of these
tasks be 2, 4, and 4 ms, respectively, the MCT equals 4 ms,
and τ1 can be converted into two tasks whose cycle times are
4 ms. So, the parameter ci in tri can be ignored. The parameter
wi in tri is the same as wi in τi. The parameters cci and pti
are not used in the integrated scheduling, so they can also be
ignored. As the security services are usually not coupled with
any hardware, the pli of the tri equals N.
Define the concept of the prodromal task set Pred(τi) and
successive task set Succ(τi) as follows:
{
Pred(τi) = , If ej,i ∈ E τj ∈ 
Succ(τi) = , If ei,j ∈ E τj ∈ . (8)
If the prodromal task set is a null set, the corresponding task
is called a start task; if the successive task set is null set, the
corresponding task is called an end task. As shown in Fig. 6,
τ1 and τ2 are the start tasks, while τ8 and τ9 are the end tasks.
The prodromal task set of τ4 is {τ2, τ3} and the successive task
set of τ4 is {τ5, τ6}.
B. Task Mapping and Scheduling
As mentioned in Section IV-B, the global tasks are described
by triples τi = (wi, sti, pli) and the DAG model G. In the pro-
cess of the integrated task mapping scheduling, the following
constraints should be taken into account.
1) Coupling Relationship Between Tasks: For a specific
application in IASs, some tasks might need to run in
the same node. Besides, as described in Section IV-A,
the tasks which are converted from a same task must run
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in the same node. The coupling relationship between τi
and τj can be represented as: if τi runs in pk, τj also
runs in pk. In order to facilitate subsequent processing,
we assume the coupled tasks are adjacent to each other.
2) Dependent Relationship Between Tasks: The dependent
relationship between tasks is described by DAG, which
can be expressed as: if ei,j ∈ E, stj ≥ sti + wi.
3) Dependent Relationship Between Tasks and Nodes: For
a specific application in IASs, some tasks can only be
executed by specific nodes. For instance, a data acquisi-
tion task must run in the corresponding sensor node. In
task τi = (wi, sti, pli), pli lists the nodes in which the
task τi can run.
4) Communication Cost Constraint: The weight of the edge
in DAG w(ei,j) is used to express the communication
load from τi to τj. In IASs, the communication band-
width is limited, thus, we consider the communication
load of the system being the sum of the communication
load between nodes.
5) Load Constraint: In the process of task mapping, at least
one task should be assigned to each node.
IASs belong to distributed systems, and communication load
between nodes is an important index of the task mapping and
scheduling in distributed systems [47]. In our research, we
select the communication load as the optimization goal, and
formulate the task mapping and scheduling as an optimization
problem.
We used binary decision variable with two indices: Y = yi,j;
i = 1, 2, . . . , n; j = 1, 2, . . . m to denote the tasks mapping on
nodes, where yi,j is defined as follows:
yi,j =
{
1, if τi is mapped on pj
0, otherwise. (9)
Because one task can only be mapped to one node, the yi,j
must satisfy the following constraint:
m∑
j=1
yi,j = 1. (10)
Define a function Q(i, j) to denote whether two tasks are
mapped on the same node
Q(i, j) =
{
1; if τi and τj are mapped on the same node
0; otherwise.
(11)
And then, the communication load of the system can be
calculated as follows:
Comm =
∑
ei,j∈E
Q(i, j) × w(ei,j
)
. (12)
To solve the task mapping and scheduling problem by a GA,
the binary decision variables Y = {yi,j}; i = 1, 2, . . . , n; j =
1, 2, . . . m are used as the chromosome. The constraints 1) and
3) are satisfied by crossover and mutation operations, and the
constraints 2), 4), and 5) are used to delete illegal individuals
in the offspring population.
1) Crossover Operation: In the process of cross, Yi =
[yi,1, . . . , yi,j, . . . , yi,m] is regarded as a meta-segment to
Algorithm 1 Task Layering Algorithm Based on DAG in
Integrated Scheduling
Require: system task model DAG G
Ensure: task_level F = {F1, F2, . . . Ftask_level}
1: F1 = {}
2: for all τ such that τ ∈ T do
3: if Pred(τ) = NULL then
4: F1.appnd(τ)
5: end if
6: end for
7: while do
8: Ftmp = {}
9: for all τ such that τ ∈ Fi do
10: Ftmp = Ftmp ∪ Succ(τ)
11: end for
12: if Ftmp = NULL then
13: Break
14: else
15: Fi+1 = Ftmp
16: end if
17: end while
18: task_level = i + 1
19: for i = 1 to task_level − 1 do
20: Fi = ∪nj=i+1FjFi
21: end for
22: return task_level F = {F1, F2, . . . Ftask_level}
meet (10). Then meta-segments are recombined through
the single-point crossover to generate offspring, with the
available crossover point set being {1, 2, . . . , n}. To meet
constraint 1), numbers of the coupled tasks are removed
in the available crossover point set. For example, if
τ2–τ4 are coupled, then, 2 and 3 are removed in the
available crossover point set. Obviously, if the parents
meet constraint 3), the offspring also meets constraint 3).
2) Mutation Operation: To meet (10), operation is similar
to the mutation operation in Section III-B. To meet con-
straint 1), if τi and τj are coupled and Yi mutate, then,
let Yj equal Yi in each offspring.
After offspring population is generated by crossover and
mutation operations, it should be checked by constraints 2), 4),
and 5). For constraint 2), the dependent relationship between
tasks is represented by DAG. Obviously, the completion of
all the prodromal tasks of task τi is a necessary condition
for task τi to be started. Thus, tasks in the DAG are lay-
ered according to the dependent relationship in Algorithm 1.
task_level is the number of task layers, and Fi is the task
set to which the task belongs to the ith layer. Considering
the whole DAG, the sum execution time (SET) that all n
tasks execute on m nodes must not exceed the MCT. Then,
for each individual represented by Y , the SET can be cal-
culated based on the layered tasks in Algorithm 2, and the
start times ST of all tasks are also determined together. The
nt(i) is used to record the available time of the ith node. In
addition, it is easy to check each individual for constraints 4)
and 5). After the optimal solution is obtained, the decision
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Algorithm 2 Task Scheduling Algorithm in Integrated
Scheduling
Require: Y F = {F1, F2, . . . Ftask_level}
Ensure: ST = [st1, st2, . . . , stn] SET
1: [nt(1), nt(2), . . . , nt(m)] = [0, 0, . . . , 0]
2: for i = 1 to task_level − 1 do
3: Mi = Ni = {}
4: for all τ such that τ ∈ Fi do
5: if Succ(τk) = NULL then
6: Ni.append(τk)
7: else
8: Mi.append(τk)
9: end if
10: end for
11: sort(Mi(τ.w))
12: sort(Ni(τ.w))
13: for j = 1 to len(Mi) do
14: τ = Mi(τj)
15: τ.st = Max
τk∈Pred(τ)
(nt(P(τ)), (τk.st + τk.wk))
16: nt(P(τ)) = τ.st + τ.w
17: end for
18: for j = 1 to len(Ni) do
19: τ = Ni(τj)
20: τ.st = Max
τk∈Pred(τ)
(nt(P(τ)), (τk.st + τk.wk))
21: nt(P(τ)) = τ.st + τ.w
22: end for
23: end for
24: N = n∪
i=1 Ni
25: SET = Max
τk∈N
(τk.st + τk.wk)
26: return SET ST
variable Y and the start time vector of all tasks ST are deter-
mined, i.e., the new task schedule tables are generated. Then,
global task set T solution is not found, as shown in Fig. 2,
the response task set Tr will be reselected, which is described
in Section III-B.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, the proposed method is implemented based
on C++, and these simulations are carried out on a 2.6-GHz
Pentium 4 laptop with 2 GB RAM to analyze and evalu-
ate the performance and efficiency of the proposed real-time
intrusion response approach in IASs. Four numerical scenar-
ios are shown in Table II. As described in Section II-A, the
number of response tasks k represents the dimension of the
security policy. Table III shows the parameters predetermined
of the corresponding realization task sets for the simula-
tion. We suppose that the security policies are PScenario1 =
{S1, S2, S3, S4}, PScenario2 = {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}, PScenario3 =
{S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}, and PScenario4 = {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5} for the
four scenarios, respectively. Table IV shows the parameters
of the system task set for the simulation. In scenario 1, the
system task set is {τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4, τ5, τ6}; in scenario 2, the
system task set is {τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4, τ5}; in scenario 3, the sys-
tem task set is {τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4, τ5, τ6, τ7, τ8, τ9, τ10}; and in
TABLE II
PARAMETERS OF THE FOUR SCENARIOS
scenario 4, all tasks are used and tasks τ1–τ10 are used twice.
The DAGs are randomly generated based on the corresponding
task sets.
A. Analysis of the Response Tasks Generation
During the process of the response tasks generation, the
Pareto solution of the response task set is generated through
NSGA II, and then the optimal solution of the response
task set is selected according to the principle described in
Section III-B.
There are two main performance metrics for response task
generation based on multiobjective optimization: 1) conver-
gence to the Pareto optimal front and 2) the maintenance of
a diverse set of solutions. Fig. 7(a) shows the Pareto solu-
tion fronts of response task generation in scenarios 1 and 2
at the 50th simulation step, and the relations between each
pair of the three optimization objectives of the Pareto opti-
mal are presented in Fig. 7(b)–(d). They show the tradeoff
among security protection time, sum of communication loads
of the response tasks, and sum of execution times of the
response tasks. After selecting the optimal solution in the
Pareto solutions, the result for the response task set gener-
ation in scenario 1 is TrScenario1 = {r11, r22, r32, r43}, and the
results for the response task set generation in scenario 2 is
TrScenario2 = {r11, r22, r32, r43, r52}. The optimization solutions
of the response task set generation are associated with the
given security policy and the realization task sets, but not
with the system task set and system nodes. Thus, Pareto opti-
mal fronts of scenarios 2–4 are the same. Based on the above
results, it can be seen that the Pareto solution of the response
tasks generation are convergent and the Pareto solution fronts
uniformly scattered.
B. Analysis of the Integrated Scheduling
The global system tasks (including response tasks and sys-
tem tasks) are mapped and scheduled synthetically through
GA based on the DAG model. Fig. 8 shows the variation of
the fitness (communication load) for four scenarios during the
genetic computation. It is found that all the individuals have
reached almost the same fitness value after about ten gen-
erations for the four scenarios, which indicates that GA has
reached the optimal solution after about ten generations. In
Fig. 8, we can infer that the appropriate generation number of
GA in the integrated scheduling module depends not only on
the number of tasks but also on the number of the nodes in
the system. This is mainly because the number of gene bits is
determined by the product of the task number and the node
number.
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TABLE III
REALIZATION TASK SETS FOR SIMULATIONS
TABLE IV
PARAMETERS OF SYSTEM TASK SET FOR THE SIMULATION
Table V shows the results of the task mapping and
scheduling for the four scenarios when set the related
parameters are set as follows: initial_population = 100 and
num_generation = 20. The results show that all tasks can
be completed in one MCT, which means that all tasks are
schedulable satisfying all constraints, and the execution of the
response tasks has no effect on the system tasks. This demon-
strates that the proposed method can achieve instant intrusion
response.
C. Real-Time Performance Evaluation
The proposed approach aims to guarantee the smooth online
enforcement of a security policy. On the other hand, the intru-
sion response that includes the proposed approach is also
implemented as a task, so the execution time needs to be eval-
uated. Thus, we must consider the real-time performance of
the proposed approach. To evaluate the real-time performance,
130 repeated tests for the four scenarios are carried out. Fig. 9
shows the real-time performance of the proposed approach of
intrusion response based on task scheduling and optimization
for the four scenarios in the repeated tests. It can be seen
that the execution times of the proposed method for all four
scenarios are less than 60 ms. The mean values are 14.82,
26.50, 26.58, and 46.28 ms, respectively. This is because the
number of the gene bits in the response task set generation
based on NSGA is
∑k
i=1 qk and the number of the gene bits
in the integrated scheduling based on GA is m ∗ n. These two
parameters are the important factors influencing the execu-
tion times of the proposed method. These results show that
the proposed algorithm can be executed in a short time. It
also means that a system can respond quickly to any cyber
attacks.
VI. SIMULATION—SIMPLIFIED TEP CONTROL SYSTEM
To further verify the effects and feasibility of the pro-
posed approach of intrusion response in real-application sys-
tems, in this section, we construct a simulation environment
based on OPEN and MATLAB, and a simplified Tennessee
Eastman process (TEP) control system is used to carry out
the simulations.
A. Simulation Setup
1) Simplified TEP and Simulation System: We used a
simplified TEP control system as Ricker [48] described to
carry out the simulations. The simplified TEP control sys-
tem is a chemical reactor plant and has been previously used
in [49] and [50]. In the chemical process, two reactants, A
and C, are used to generate the product D, while B is an inert
product. The schematic of the simplified TEP control system
is shown in Fig. 10. More details on the simplified TEP can
be found in [49] and [50].
In the simulation, we focused on a field control system
for industrial automation and do not consider links to the
outside networks. The simplified TEP control system in an
OPNET environment is shown in Fig. 11. The physical pro-
cess is simulated in the MATLAB environment, and the control
component is implemented in an OPNET environment. This
simplified TEP model and the associated multiloop PI control
law proposed in [48] are used. The communication network
is a controller area network (CAN) bus, which is also imple-
mented in the OPNET environment. The model of the physical
process is called an agent node (PA in Fig. 11) in OPNET.
The simulation system contains one master node (MN) and
five slave nodes (one plant agent node and four controller
nodes). All nodes are connected to a CAN bus to exchange
messages.
Based on the above simulation system, the dynamic security
protection shown in Fig. 1 is implemented. It is important to
note that this paper focuses on security policy enforcement,
thus the rest of the dynamic security protection is only real-
ized in a simple way. An intrusion detection module is used
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 7. Pareto solutions of the MOOP for the response task set generation in
the scenarios. (a) Pareto optimal fronts in scenarios 1 and 2. Relation between
(b) ET and CC, (c) CC and PT, and (d) ET and PT.
to generate a security policy online that is used for the input
to the security policy enforcement. The intrusion detection
module can generate an integer that ranges between 0 and 3.
0 represents no cyberattack, while “1,” “2,” and “3” represent
three types of cyberattacks. The intrusion detection module is
implemented in all the nodes and used to simulate the intru-
sion detection component of Fig. 1. The intrusion response
module contains two parts: 1) security policy decision and
2) security policy enforcement, which is implemented in the
MN. To implement the security policy decision, each type of
attack corresponds to a security policy P. The parameters of
the security policies are predetermined, and are presented in
Fig. 8. Convergence of the proposed integrated scheduling-based GA for the
four scenarios.
Fig. 9. Real-time performance for four scenarios.
Table VI. The proposed method of security policy enforce-
ment is also implemented according to the descriptions in
Sections III and IV. The process models of the MN node
and the other nodes are presented in Fig. 12. In the MN, the
DETECT process contains one task, i.e., intrusion detection,
and the RESPONSE process also contains only one task, i.e.,
intrusion response. The CAN_TX and CAN_RX processes are
responsible for the network communication for the node. The
other tasks are in the APP process. Because we only con-
sider the execution time of intrusion detection in this paper,
in other nodes (slave nodes), a useless task is used to simu-
late the real-intrusion detection in the DETECT process. The
APP, CAN_TX, and CAN_RX processes are these processes in
the MN. As shown in Fig. 2, the updated scheduling tables
are broadcasted through the CAN bus after they are changed.
All nodes are reconfigured according to the corresponding
scheduling tables.
2) Parameter Configuration: Table VI shows the system
tasks of the simplified TEP control system. The execution
times of these tasks are obtained by estimation, according to
the corresponding code. The periods ci and the pli are deter-
mined by the application. In the intrusion detection task, some
dummy code is inserted to simulate the execution time of the
real-intrusion detection. In practice, the PA node is nonexis-
tent, as it is only for communication between the physical
system and the control system. Thus, the PA node and its
tasks are not considered in the following simulations. To facil-
itate understanding, we label the nodes MN, FC, PC1, PC2,
and CC for the simulation system shown in Fig. 11 as p1–p5,
respectively.
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TABLE V
RESULT OF TASK MAPPING AND SCHEDULING FOR THE FOUR SCENARIOS
Fig. 10. Schematic of the simplified TEP control system.
Fig. 11. Simplified TEP control system in OPNET environment.
The decision table for the security policy is designed as
follows: when there is no attack, the security policy P is
an empty set; when an attack of Type 1 occurs, the secu-
rity policy is PType1 = {S1, S2}; when an attack of Type 2
occurs, the security policy is PType2 = {S1, S3}; for a Type 3
attack, the security policy is PType3 = {S1, S2, S3}. This
means that the response tasks are generated from the cor-
responding security policy P. The security services S1–S3
TABLE VI
PARAMETERS OF SYSTEM TASKS IN THE
SIMPLIFIED TEP CONTROL SYSTEM
that are used in the security policy can be implemented
by the corresponding realization task sets R1–R3, respec-
tively. The parameters of the realization tasks are given in
Table VII. These realization tasks are prestored as functions in
the nodes.
B. Simulation Results
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed method in
the simulation system, the intrusion detection component
generates the following output:
Output =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, t ∈ [0, 10) ∪ [70, 100)
1, t ∈ [10, 30)
2, t ∈ [30, 50)
3, t ∈ [50, 70).
(13)
Table VIII shows the Pareto solution for the response task
set generation for t = 50. As described in Section III-B, the
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TABLE VII
REALIZATION TASK SETS OF THE THREE SECURITY SERVICES
TABLE VIII
PARETO SOLUTION FOR THE RESPONSE TASK SET GENERATION FOR t = 50
(a)
(b)
Fig. 12. Process models of the (a) MN and the (b) slave node in OPNET.
optimal response task set is the one with the largest security
protection time in the Pareto solution. Thus, the optimal solu-
tion of the response task set generation is Tr = {r11, r23, r32}.
Fig. 13. Comparison of dynamic response yF of the simplified TEP control
system.
Then, through the integrated scheduling module, we can
obtain the optimal solution of the integrated task mapping
and the corresponding task scheduling table. Due to limited
space, Table IX only shows the integrated task mapping and
the corresponding task scheduling table for tasks reconfigured
for t = 50. The result shows that all tasks (including system
tasks and response tasks) are schedulable, and the sum of the
execution times of all the nodes does not exceed the MCT
(3000 ms). It also means that response tasks can successfully
be carried out with no effect on the execution of the system
tasks.
Table IX shows the execution of all the tasks from the per-
spective of task scheduling. Control performance is also an
important factor for IASs. From the perspective of control
engineering, it should also be guaranteed that the execution
of a security policy will have no effect on the control per-
formance of the system. Fig. 13 provides a comparison of
dynamic response yF between the normal simplified TEP con-
trol system and the system with dynamic security protection. It
clearly shows that the dynamic security protection has almost
no influence on the dynamic response of the simplified TEP
control system.
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TABLE IX
RESULT OF TASK MAPPING AND SCHEDULING FOR t = 50
In the above simulations, there are three different security
policies. This is because the proposed approach of intrusion
response can be clearly explained based on these configura-
tions, and security policy decision is not the focus of this paper.
In real-dynamic security protection of IASs, security policies
generated from the security policy decision is complex and
varied. From the above simulation results, it can be seen that
the proposed real-time control approach of intrusion response
is an effective method to guarantee the smooth, timely exe-
cution of the security policy without effect on system control
performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
Timely intrusion detection and response is the key idea for
online security protection for IASs. In this paper, we proposed
a general real-time control approach based on table-driven task
scheduling of intrusion response for IASs, which utilizes TBS
criteria and integrates the response tasks and system tasks into
the scheduling and optimization after consideration of a num-
ber of requirements. First, to meet the wide variety of security
requirements for security protection of IASs, the security pol-
icy is formalized as a group of security services with different
types. Each type of security service can be realized by many
tasks, and these compose the realization task set for the cor-
responding security service. The response tasks are generated
through an NSGA-II algorithm according to the security pol-
icy. Then, to mitigate the execution of the response tasks, an
integrated scheduling strategy based on the GA is designed to
map and schedule the system tasks and response tasks together.
The proposed method has been implemented using the C++
language and analyzed on several synthetic applications. Then,
a simplified TEP control system was used to further verify
the effectiveness of the proposed method in dynamic secu-
rity protection based on OPNET and MATLAB environments.
Simulation results have shown that the given security policy
can be smoothly implemented and achieve the instant intrusion
response without effect on the normal operation of the system.
Currently, all nodes are considered as homogeneous. In fact,
there are also many heterogeneous nodes in most IASs. Further
improvement to this paper can be made by considering the
inclusion of heterogeneous node. In addition, this paper focused
on security policy enforcement, and did not discuss security
policy generation. Therefore, security policy generation based
on decision theory of intrusion response will be considered.
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